Resolving Quine's Confict: A Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic by Bryant, Amanda
Australasian Journal of Logic
Resolving Quine’s Conflict: A
Neo-Quinean View of the Rational
Revisability of Logic1
Amanda Bryant, CUNY Graduate Center
abryant@gradcenter.cuny.edu
A number of authors have noted that Quine seems to be of two minds re-
garding the rational revisability of logic (Arnold and Shapiro 2007, Haack 1974a,
Dummett 1978a, Priest 2006a). Although Quine is clearly committed to the ra-
tional revisability of logic, some of his other philosophical commitments appear
to rule out its possibility. His commitment to rational revisability is clear be-
cause he explicitly declares it and because at least two of his claims imply it,
namely: i) the web of belief is universally revisable and ii) there are criteria
for choice among logics. However, Quine’s principle of charitable translation
and his change of logic, change of subject argument appear to conflict with the
rational revisability of logic. I argue that upon analysis, the apparent tension
dissolves, and Quine consistently holds a revisability thesis. However, Quine’s
revisability thesis is weak, because it severely restricts the manner in which re-
vision can occur. I argue that a stronger revisability thesis is consistent with the
spirit of Quine’s work. Since I do not claim that the stronger thesis is present
in Quine’s work, explicitly or implicitly, I call the stronger thesis Neo-Quinean.
To articulate the Neo-Quinean thesis, I distinguish between: 1) logic in theory
and logic in practice, 2) laymen’s logic and considered logic, and lastly 3) evolu-
tionary revision and revolutionary revision. The Neo-Quinean thesis is that all
logics are revisable in some manner or other : laymen’s practice is subject only
to evolutionary revision, while considered theories and practices are subject to
both evolutionary and revolutionary revision. My purpose here is to show that
the Neo-Quinean view is a coherent theoretical option.
1I wish to thank Graham Priest for his invaluable feedback at various stages in the devel-
opment of this paper. Thanks also to Hartry Field for comments and encouragement on an
early draft. Thanks to Zach Weber and an anonymous reviewer for their suggestions. Finally,
thank you to the audience members at my talk “Resolving the Quinean Conflict: Ground-
work for a Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic” on January 26, 2016
at Frontiers of Non-Classicality: Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy for their helpful questions
and comments. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada.
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 2
31
§1 For Rational Revisability
As I will use the term, to revise logic is to start or stop accepting a logical
principle or set of principles, or to start or stop using the principle or prin-
ciples.2,3 For logic to be rationally revisable is for it to be possible to revise
logic a) for reasons, and b) without violating any of the necessary conditions of
rationality.4,5 So a rational revision includes not only a change in principles,
but some justificatory work as well. I remain neutral on the precise conditions
of rationality.
There are a number of reasons to think that Quine is firmly committed to
the rational revisability of logic, so understood. First, he explicitly avows the
rational revisability of logic. In Philosophy of Logic, he writes, “Logic is in
principle no less open to revision than quantum mechanics or the theory of
relativity” (1970, 100). Since physics is demonstrably revisable, and rationally
so, then logic must be rationally revisable. Moreover, this avowal seems not to
be made uncritically. Rather, other elements of Quine’s philosophy support the
rational revisability of logic.
§1.1 Universal Revisability
First, Quine’s commitment to the universal revisability of the web of belief
implies the rational revisability of logic. In Two Dogmas of Empiricism, he
describes the web of belief as follows:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs ... is a man-made
fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.... A con-
flict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior.... Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of
others, because of their logical interconnections—the logical laws be-
ing in turn simply certain further statements of the system. (1951,
42)
Our beliefs form a network that we rationally strive to keep in full alignment.
The edges of the web are highly dependent on experience. If experience comes
into conflict with certain beliefs, we revise them to make them better cohere
with experience.6 Beliefs that are minimally affected by experience inhabit the
centre of the web: “highly theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology
... may be thought of as relatively centrally located within the total network”
2For my purposes here, I bracket cases where one neither accepts nor rejects the principle
in question (see Warren 2016) and where elements of the belief base are fuzzy (see Booth and
Richter 2005).
3See for example Ripley (2013b), Roeper (2004), and Beall (2009).
4For examples of the sorts of reasons for which one might revise, see Burgess (2012),
Dummett (1978b), Field (2003), Haack (1974b) and (1996), Mares (2002), Priest (2006b) and
(2008), Putnam (1957) and (1983), Salerno (2000), and Wright (1992).
5For arguments that logic is not rationally revisable, see Berger (2011), Katz (2000, §3.3),
and Shapiro (2000).
6See Chase (2012) for two formalizations of Quinean revisability.
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 2
32
(1951, 44). Revisions to those central beliefs create a “devastatingly widespread
unfixing of truth values” (1960b, 60). The central beliefs are so entrenched
and integral to the shape of the web that altering them necessitates widespread
revision.
The centrality of logic to the web prima facie undermines its rational revis-
ability, because one might think that logic is so distant from the periphery that
there could never be a rational impetus to revise it. However, Quine does not
take the central place of logic within the web of belief to undermine its rational
revisability. Rather, he famously defends universal revisability : “no statement
is immune to revision” (1951, 43). He goes on to say:
Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been
proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what
difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift
whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin
Aristotle. (1951, 43)
If these highly theoretical, central beliefs are subject to revision, then so too is
logic. Revisions to logical beliefs are a species of theoretical revolution and, if
his examples are any guide, rational revolution. According to Quine, the web
of belief is universally rationally revisable, so logic is rationally revisable.
§1.2 Criteria for Choice Among Logics
Quine also implies rational revisability when he gives criteria for choice
among logics. First, he claims that any revision should be guided by the “maxim
of minimum mutilation” (1970, 85). This is a conservative principle of theory
choice, but a principle of choice nonetheless. He also says that any revision
should minimize the loss of clarity, elegance, efficiency, simplicity, beauty, fa-
miliarity, and convenience (1970, 85-6). One should, for example, avoid the
introduction of paradox (1970, 85). Moreover, not all of the criteria are equally
important; sometimes we must weigh them against one another. For instance,
Quine points out, the mathematician “admits the irrational numbers so as to
round out arithmetic and simplify computation” (1970, 86). Ceteris peribus,
“the less such fat the better,” but since the additional theoretical machinery
simplifies computation, “it is rather to be excused than excised” (1970, 86). In
this case, convenience trumps elegance. This shows that it can be rational to re-
vise even when a theoretical alternative does relatively poorly on some criterion.
So Quine specifies a number of criteria for rational theory choice and gestures
toward a method of choice that weighs those criteria against one another.
Admittedly, Quine’s reason for articulating the criteria is to show that ra-
tionally, one ought not to revise classical logic. He thinks that so-called deviant
logics do poorly on the criteria he names:
let us not underestimate the price of a deviant logic. There is a
serious loss of simplicity, especially when the new logic is not even
a many-valued truth-functional logic. And there is a loss, still more
serious, on the score of familiarity. (1970, 86)
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Furthermore, using deviant logic is somehow a “handicap” (1970, 86). Intuition-
istic logic, in particular, “lacks the familiarity, the convenience, the simplicity,
and the beauty of our logic” (1970, 86). Unfortunately, Quine does not spell
out these criteria, how to weigh them, why we should use them, or how exactly
deviant logics violate them. So his discussion of criteria for theory selection,
and of the failure of deviant logics to satisfy them, is incomplete. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that he specifies criteria. So his view seems to be that given
the current, contingent state of theoretical development, we ought not to revise
classical logic, but that logic is in principle rationally revisable. If logic were
not in principle rationally revisable, there would be no question of choosing
among logics and no use for criteria of theory choice. In sum, Quine is clearly
committed to the rational revisability of logic, because 1) he explicitly avows
it, 2) he asserts the universal revisability of the web of belief, and 3) he articu-
lates criteria for choice among logics, as well as a choice procedure that involves
weighing criteria against one another.
§2 Against Rational Revisability
§2.1 Charitable Translation
Although Quine’s commitment to rational revisability is clear, some of his
other philosophical commitments appear to conflict with it. In Chapter 2 of
Word and Object, Quine argues for a principle of charity with respect to the
translation of non-English sentences and the interpretation of English sentences.
According to Quine, “Wanton translation can make natives sound as queer as
one pleases. Better translation imposes our logic upon them” (1960b, 58). For
instance, he says, suppose that the members of some tribe “accept as true a
certain heathen sentence of the form ‘q ka bu q’ ” and we translate it ‘p and not
p’ (1960a, 352). In Quine’s view, the translation is bad, because “If any evidence
can count against a lexicographer’s adoption of ‘and’ and ‘not’ as translations
of ‘ka’ and ‘bu’, certainly the natives’ acceptance of ‘q ka bu q’ as true counts
overwhelmingly” (1960a, 352). It counts overwhelmingly because:
assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn
on hidden differences of language.... The common sense behind the
maxim is that one’s interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is
less likely than bad translation - or, in the domestic case, linguistic
divergence. (1960b, 59)
On Quine’s view, it is not inconceivable that the native really does accept a
contradiction as true, but it is far more likely that we have mistranslated her
utterances. The best translation assumes the more likely scenario. So “[w]e
build the logic into our manual of translation” (1970, 82). Regarding the inter-
pretation of English sentences, Quine says:
when to our querying of an English sentence an English speaker
answers ‘Yes and no’, we assume that the queried sentence is meant
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differently in the affirmation and negation; this rather than that he
would be so silly as to affirm and deny the same thing. (1960b, 59)
When a speaker appears to assert a contradiction, the charitable listener inter-
prets away the contradiction. According to Quine’s principle of charity, the best
interpretation of an utterance imposes classical logic on it.7
An alternate formulation of the principle of charity is the motto “Save the
obvious” (1970, 82). Quine explains:
I am using the word ‘obvious’ in an ordinary behavioral sense, with
no epistemological overtones. When I call ‘1 + 1 = 2’ obvious to
a community I mean only that everyone, nearly enough, will un-
hesitatingly assent to it, for whatever reason; and when I call ‘It is
raining’ obvious in particular circumstances I mean that everyone
will assent to it in those circumstances. (1970, 82)
That which is obvious invokes assent from nearly everyone in a given community,
under the right sorts of circumstances. According to Quine, “every logical truth
is obvious, actually or potentially,” where it is clear from the context that the
logical truths in question are those of classical logic (1970, 82).8 That is, every
classical logical truth “is either obvious as it stands or can be reached from ob-
vious truths by a sequence of individually obvious steps” (1970, 83). In Quine’s
view, since the principles of classical logic are obvious and since translation and
interpretation should save the obvious, translation and interpretation should
impose classical logic. Any deviance will be translated away in the interests of
preserving the obvious.
Non-classical logicians should not find the principle of charity, or of obvious-
ness preservation, particularly charitable. When applied to logic, the principle
requires that when someone attempts to articulate a heterodox logic, we “im-
pute our orthodox logic to him, or impose it upon him, by translating his deviant
dialect” (1970, 81). According to Quine:
even the most audacious system-builder is bound by the law of
contradiction... [because if] he were to accept contradiction... we
would proceed to reconstrue his heroically novel logic as a non-
contradictory logic, perhaps even as familiar logic in perverse no-
tation. (1960b, 59)
7Though Quine privileges classical logic in his formulation of the translation argument,
note that the argument can be framed in neutral terms. On that neutral characterization,
charitable interpretation in accordance with one’s own antecedently accepted logic, whatever
that may be, precludes communication of alternative logics. In other words, the problem of
charitable translation is symmetric. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this
out.
8Of course, not everyone agrees that the principles of classical logic are in fact obvious.
Priest, for instance, comments “the claim that logic is obvious is mind-numbingly false”
(2006a, 172). See also Cobreros et. al. (2012) and Ripley (2013a), who claim that classical
principles like explosion are counterintuitive.
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In the interests of good translation, the listener will not countenance deviance,
but will instead translate it away. This claim leads some interpreters of Quine,
such as Haack, to attribute to him the view that “apparent conflict in logic
should always be accounted the result of mistranslation” (Haack 1996, 14, orig-
inal emphasis). According to Haack, if that is the case, then “there can be no
genuine rivals to classical logic” (1996, 15). To the extent that revision requires
alternative logics, if there are no rivals, there can be no revision. On Haack’s
reading, Quine’s principle of charitable translation precludes rival logics, there-
fore it precludes revising logic. If so, then Quine is inconsistent regarding the
rational revisability of logic.
But this is too quick. The principle of translation and interpretation allows
that rivalry may be countenanced by a single individual, and the impetus to
revise may be arrived at independently of others. That is because, at the indi-
vidual level, there is no question of translation or interpretation, since individual
reflection is not communicative and since the translation argument kicks in only
when communication enters the picture. So the translation argument does not
rule out individual revisions undertaken independently of others.
However, one might object that to countenance rival systems, an individual
must imagine a counterpart who uses a rival system and interpret her counter-
part’s imagined linguistic behaviour.9 If so, then the individual should be chari-
table and translate away the deviance of her counterpart’s imagined utterances.
But we have introduced some unnecessary machinery. The individual need not
imagine a counterpart exhibiting linguistic behaviour; she need only counte-
nance a new principle or the negation of one of the principles she antecedently
accepts. That is, she can directly countenance a change to her accepted logical
system; linguistic behaviour, real or imagined, need not enter the picture. For
instance, she can think to herself ‘What if p and ¬p?’ and consider the impact ‘p
and ¬p’ would have to her system of reasoning and to the inferences she makes.
In doing so, she does not have to interpret a thing. She must simply be aware
of the content of her own thoughts. And setting aside unconscious thoughts
or conscious thoughts not currently accessed, she is. Since charity only enters
the picture when we lack awareness of a person’s thoughts, there is no need
for charity here. So Quine’s translation argument does not rule out individual
revision.
Rather, it rules out collaborative revision. On this view, revision could never
involve debate, dialogue, explanation, persuasion, and so on. Now, to the extent
that the principle of charitable translation is normative, it does not rule out the
very possibility of communicating rivalry, since two people might simply fail to
adhere to the principle. Rather, Quine normatively rules out the communication
of rivalry. He thinks we should follow his principle of translation, and if we
follow it, then we cannot communicate rivalry.10 This view is not at odds with
any of the claims discussed in §1, since Quine never claims explicitly that rational
9I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this objection.
10Priest argues that we should take the principle of translation to be defeasible (2006a,
172). If Quine means it to be defeasible, he should a) say so, and b) give us some sense of the
conditions under which it can be defeated.
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revision can or should be collaborative.11 So there is no full-on inconsistency in
Quine with regard to the rational revisability of logic.
§2.2 Change of Subject
In Ch. 6 of Philosophy of Logic, Quine claims that deviant logicians and clas-
sical logicians cannot genuinely debate logic, because they respectively discuss
different subject matters. According to Quine, when logicians attempt to for-
mulate deviant principles, the deviance is “merely. . . notational and phonetic”
(1970, 81). If a logician were to take the laws that classically govern disjunction
to govern conjunction instead, and vice versa, Quine would say that the logician
has “For obscure reasons, if any. . . taken to writing ‘and’ in place of ‘or’ and vice
versa” (1970, 81). So when a person “espouses a logic whose laws are ostensi-
bly contrary to our own, we are ready to speculate that he is just giving some
familiar old vocables (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘all’, etc.) new meanings” (1960b, 59).
Regarding the “popular extravaganza” rejecting the law of non-contradiction,
Quine says that no participant in the debate
knows what he is talking about. They think they are talking about
negation, ‘∼’, ‘not’; but surely the notation ceased to be recogniz-
able as negation when they took to regarding some conjunctions of
the form ‘p· ∼ p’ as true, and stopped regarding such sentences as
implying all others. Here, evidently, is the deviant logician’s predica-
ment: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject.
(1970, 81)
When the symbol that normally indicates classical negation is used differently,
we are no longer talking about the same thing. The subject has changed from
negation to something else. If so, then deviant logicians and classical logicians
talk past one another. The classical logician speaks of one particular set of laws,
while the deviant logician speaks of another.
The change of subject argument prima facie precludes the rational revis-
ability of logic for the following reason. If the deviant logician and the classical
logician talk past one another, then it is unclear how they could possibly ar-
ticulate a disagreement. Disagreement occurs only with respect to some shared
subject matter — for instance, the nature of conjunction as such. However, the
two logicians share no subject matter, and in Quine’s view, there is no ‘nature
of conjunction as such’ (1970, 81). There is “no residual essence of conjunction
and alternation in addition to the sounds and notations and the laws in confor-
mity with which a man uses those sounds and notations” (1970, 81). That is,
there is no fact of the matter about what a connective means over and above
the meanings that we assign to it in practice. Since there is a plurality of prac-
tices, there is a plurality of meanings. There is no ‘one true’ subject matter
about which to debate. Prima facie, if there is no genuine disagreement, there
11He does claim that there is no difference in principle between logical revision and scien-
tific revolution, and scientific revolutions are certainly collaborative. However, this piece of
evidence is too weak to support a claim that Quine is flat-out inconsistent.
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is no genuine rivalry — the various systems do not compete against or conflict
with one another. If there is no genuine rivalry, then there is no possibility of
revision.12
That said, the change of subject argument is not really at odds with the
rational revisability of logic. That is because Quine does not establish full
incommensurability among logics. Even if there are different subject matters at
issue, they can surely be adjudicated, either by making use of overlap between
systems or by adopting a metalanguage that is neutral between them. What
Quine’s argument does show is that rival logics are not rivals in the sense of
contradicting one another, but in the sense of being theoretical alternatives.
Quine even admits that there may be good reasons for selecting a different
theoretical alternative:
whoever denies the law of excluded middle changes the subject. This
is not to say that he is wrong in so doing. In repudiating ‘p or ∼ p’
he is indeed giving up classical negation, or perhaps alternation, or
both; and he may have his reasons. (Quine 1970, 83).
In other words, changing the subject can be rational. For instance, one might
give up bivalence in the interests of accommodating vagueness (Quine 1981, 94).
So the change of subject argument does not rule out the rational revisability of
logic; it merely refines our understanding of rivalry.
In sum: although the principle of charitable translation and the change of
subject argument prima facie rule out the rational revisability of logic, neither
actually rules it out.13 The change of subject argument merely characterizes
rational revision rather than refuting its possibility. The principle of charitable
translation, however, normatively rules out collaborative revision. If we accept
the normative constraint placed on us by the principle of charitable translation,
we are left with the following thesis:
Quine’s Revisability Thesis: Logic is rationally revisable, but only at the
level of the individual.
The thesis holds that I can personally revise the logic that I accept or use, but I
cannot communicate the revision to others, or coordinate with others to achieve
collaborative revision. Quine’s Revisability Thesis is weak, insofar as it severely
limits the manner of revision. It also suggests, implausibly, that logicians who
seem to discuss rival logics intelligibly either i.) don’t, or ii.) fail to be charitable.
However, I will argue that we can square a more robust revisability thesis with
Quine’s framework — one that preserves the possibility of genuine debate and
collaborative revision. Here we depart from pure exegesis.
12Against Quine’s change of subject argument, see the flourishing literature on logical
pluralism: Allo (2007); Beall and Restall (2000), (2001) and (2006); Cook (2010); Dicher
(2016); Goddu (2002); Lynch (2008); Restall (2002); Russell (2008); Wyatt (2004), and van
Benthem (2008). See also Field (2009), Keefe (2014), and Priest (2001) in response.
13I have treated the translation argument and the change of subject argument separately.
Compare Warren (2016), who sees the translation argument as an argument for a ‘change of
logic, change of meaning’ thesis, and defends the thesis.
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§3 Neo-Quinean Revisability
So far I have argued that the apparent tension in Quine’s work regarding
the rational revisability of logic dissolves on analysis. His change of subject
argument simply characterizes rival logics as theoretical alternatives — and one
may have reasons for choosing a certain theoretical alternative over others. His
principle of charitable translation, on the other hand, makes more trouble and
rules out collaborative revision. So we are left with the Quinean Revisability
Thesis, which permits only individual revisions. In the next section, I will
show how Quine’s framework can be augmented to support genuine debate and
collaborative revision.
§3.1 Distinctions
To square the possibility of genuine debate and collaborative revision with
Quine’s framework, I distinguish between: 1) logic in theory and logic in prac-
tice, 2) laymen’s logic and considered logic, and 3) evolutionary and revolution-
ary revision of logic.
Distinction 1: logic in theory versus logic in practice
This distinction is meant to track, roughly, the medieval distinction between
logica docens and logica utens, which Peirce (1985) makes use of and to which
Priest (2014) assigns importance.14 According to Peirce:
a man cannot truly reason without having some notions about the
classification of arguments. But the classification of arguments is
the chief business of the science of logic; so that every man who
reasons... has necessarily a rudimentary science of logic, good or
bad. The slang of the medieval universities called this his logica
utens, — his ‘logic in possession’, — in contradistinction to logica
docens, or the legitimate doctrine that is to be learned by study.
(1985, 891-892)
Logica utens refers to the manner in which individuals classify arguments in
practice; logica docens refers to something more explicitly theoretical. The
distinction is a useful one. By logic in theory, I mean abstract sets of logical
principles and rules of inference. By logic in practice, I mean actual inferential
practices.
Distinction 2: laymen’s logic versus considered logic
Next, I distinguish laymen’s logic from what I will call considered logic. Lay-
men’s logic is the pre-theoretic set of inferential practices that, according to
Quine, most people engage in. There are some abstract principles underlying
those practices, which may or may not be consciously recognized. Those princi-
ples are the ones that, Quine thinks, would strike most people as obvious were
14I wish to credit Graham Priest for drawing my attention to this distinction.
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they made explicit: the classical principles.15 Laymen’s logic is what Quine
frequently calls “our logic” (e.g. 1970, 81, 82, 83). Laymen’s logic is the prac-
ticed logic of a very broadly construed community of individuals who need not
explicitly recognize any theory of logic.
Considered logic, on the other hand, must be accompanied by some theoreti-
cal knowledge. A considered logic could be a theory that is consciously held or a
practice that is informed by a background of theoretical knowledge. Considered
logic need not be classical.
Distinction 3: evolutionary versus revolutionary revision of logic
The final distinction hinges primarily on the speed and scope of the revi-
sion. Revolutions occur quickly and all at once; evolution occurs gradually, in
a piecemeal manner. Revolutionary revision may consist in the rejection of a
single classical principle, such as the law of excluded middle in the case of intu-
itionistic logic, or the distribution principle in the case of quantum logic. It may
also consist in the rejection of several principles. Evolutionary revision may also
be of broad or of narrow scope. When the revision is narrow in scope — say,
a matter of adopting or rejecting a single principle — it is prima facie unclear
how the revision could proceed gradually. However, it can proceed gradually
for a couple of reasons. First, though revision does not require consensus at the
level of a community, one might wish to establish it, and doing so would require
time. Moreover, recall that rational revision involves justifying the revision,
which may also take time.
§3.2: Distinctions Brought to Bear
With the above distinctions in hand, we may now square the possibility of
collaborative revision with Quine’s framework. The Neo-Quinean resolution has
two components:
1) The translation argument normatively rules out revolution with respect
to laymen’s practice (but not its evolution).
2) The arguments in favour of rational revision allow evolution and revolu-
tion with respect to considered logics, both theories and practices.
According to the first component, the translation argument rules out very rapid
changes to the practice of the laymen. That is because the logic that we impose
in translation is the logic of the laymen — according to Quine, it is their logic
that is obvious, actually or potentially. What is obvious is not subject to rev-
olution, because when it comes to obvious principles, “It is hard to face up to
the rejection of anything so basic” (1970, 84). The obvious is entrenched, so it
resists changing all at once.16 Moreover, since laymen’s logic is shared, its rev-
olution would require massive social coordination — it would require that the
15Just as it is not clear that most people find the classical principles obvious (see fn. 8),
it is not clear that laymen’s logic is in fact classical. Whether it is, is an empirical question.
Any advocate of the Neo-Quinean view would have to support with evidence the claim that
laymen’s logic is classical.
16See Carlson (2015) for discussion of this aspect of Quine’s view.
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masses suddenly change their inferential practices. Since the translation argu-
ment precludes such coordination from being achieved via linguistic persuasion,
such coordination would be highly coincidental and so is fantastically unlikely.
And what could motivate everyone, all at once, to change their practices? Be-
cause this massively coincidental, mysteriously motivated social coordination is
virtually impossible, the Neo-Quinean rules out revolutionary revision.
However, the Neo-Quinean does not rule out evolutionary revision. Though
the obvious is entrenched, it can still undergo gradual change. As Quine puts
it: “logic is integral to our system of the world and accessible to change in
the same way as the rest [of the system]. Obviousness resists change but does
not preclude it” (1990, 36). That is, what people unhesitatingly assent to can
change, but it must do so gradually. This evolutionary picture of the revision
of laymen’s logic fits well with Quine’s comment that, regarding revision, he is
“urging... a doctrine of gradualism” (1970, 100).
Without explicit theoretical reasons, what could motivate evolutionary re-
vision of laymen’s logic? Well, we might find that certain inferential practices
just work better for whatever pragmatic purposes we have. From Quine’s point
of view, this isn’t very likely (our logic resists change), but to the extent that
we can’t a priori rule out anything, we can’t a priori rule out such an impetus
for changing our practice. So, while it is difficult to imagine what could possi-
bly motivate everyone to change their inferential practices all at once, it is less
difficult to imagine that we might gradually discover that certain alternative
inferential practices just serve us better.
Now, how could this gradual evolution of laymen’s practice proceed? Since
laymen’s logic is pre-theoretic, the change would be a change to our inferential
practices, not necessarily to any of our explicit beliefs. So a revision of laymen’s
logic wouldn’t necessarily require communication, or interpretation, of deviant
principles. We could just change, over time, the way we respond to the situations
and stimuli we are presented with, as well as the responses we accept from others.
That is, we could just change how we infer and which inferential outputs we
accept. As Resnik puts it:
Just as we carry out this practice largely without thinking, we also
revise it largely without thinking. We simply no longer accept spe-
cific inferential connections or, more frequently, we recognize new
ones. Like changes in a language certain inferential practices may
slowly and quietly become obsolete and new ones may unceremoni-
ously evolve. (2004, 189)
Inferential practices can evolve just as linguistic practices do. But the evolution
of linguistic practices hinges on non-standard uses of language being under-
stood. Likewise, doesn’t the evolution of inferential practices hinge on non-
standard inferential outputs like ‘p and not p’ being understood? And doesn’t
the translation argument rule that out? I answer no to both. First, we don’t
have to understand each other for our practices to change. We simply have to
behave differently. Second, the translation argument only precludes someone
whose practice accords with classical principles from understanding inferential
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outputs that do not accord with those principles. It doesn’t preclude communi-
cation among individuals who have converged on some set of shared inferential
practices through independently undertaken revisions. While such convergence
might seem wildly implausible, we must remember that the revisions we under-
take are driven by the same forces: the worldly phenomena we are presented with
and the pragmatic purposes we often share. And to the extent that the revisions
would occur piecemeal and the convergence emerge gradually, evolutionary re-
vision wouldn’t require, as revolutionary revision would, sudden, coincidental,
massive social coordination. Rather, the evolution of laymen’s practice would
be initiated by brave individuals adapting to their worldly situation and in ac-
cordance with their pragmatic purposes.17 If the practices really do serve us
better, then conceivably, a critical mass of these individual revisions may occur
and a community of non-standard inferrers form. Those outside the commu-
nity could observe its members’ non-standard practices and imitate them. The
practices could spread and the community expand. Ultimately, what started
as the non-standard practices of a few eccentric individuals could become stan-
dard. If so, then an evolutionary revision of laymen’s logic will have occurred.
Again, Quine does not take any of this to be likely, since our practice of assent
resists change. Nevertheless, the point is that it can change, but only through
evolutionary revision.
Note that this evolutionary revision of laymen’s logic is not yet the sort of
collaborative revision I set out to square with Quine’s framework. It cannot
proceed via debate and dialogue. But we shouldn’t expect it to, since laymen’s
logic is just a set of pre-theoretic practices and the changes to that practice
occur ‘largely without thinking’. Collaborative revision enters via the second
component of the Neo-Quinean solution, which I turn to now.
The second component of the Neo-Quinean resolution holds that considered
logics can be revised in whatever manner — through evolution or revolution.
In fact, as I noted above, Quine explicitly likens revision to revolution on more
than one occasion (1951, 43 and 1970, 100). Considered logics are subject to
both kinds of revision because, unlike laymen’s logic, they are not entrenched —
they are not ‘integral to our system of the world’. Switching between considered
logics is usually not devastating to the shape of one’s belief structure. So these
considered principles are amenable to change in a way that laymen’s practice
isn’t. Moreover, considered logical systems are usually adopted for theoretical
or heuristic reasons. From a theoretical or heuristic point of view, it would
not be silly to accept a contradiction. So charity does not require that we
translate away the deviance of principles of considered logics. This means that
although evolutionary revision of laymen’s logic cannot proceed collaboratively,
revisions of considered logics can. Neither revolution nor evolution with respect
to considered logics is problematic from the Neo-Quinean point of view. So we
are left with the following thesis:
17Brave to the extent that, as Resnik points out, “Consciously going against your per-
ceptions of what your audience expects you to conclude requires a great deal of intellectual
courage... [since] sanctions for making ‘obvious errors’ in logic are severe” (2004, 190).
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Neo-Quinean Revisability Thesis: All logics are rationally revisable in some
manner or other; laymen’s logic is rationally revisable only by evolution, while
considered theories and practices are rationally revisable by evolution and by
revolution.
Recall that the weak Quinean thesis we saw above claimed that logic, broadly
understood, is revisable in just one way: by individuals, independently of others.
By contrast, the Neo-Quinean thesis allows some revisions — revisions of con-
sidered logics — to involve and even hinge on successful acts of communication,
and therefore allows them to be collaborative. While the Quinean Revisability
Thesis is somewhat weak and unsatisfying, the Neo-Quinean Revisability Thesis
enables a more robust, interesting, and nuanced picture of revision.
§4 Conclusion
There is an apparent tension in Quine’s work regarding the rational revisability
of logic. On the one hand, he avows its rational revisability, commits himself to
universal revisability, and articulates criteria for choice among logics. On the
other hand, the principle of charitable translation (or obviousness preservation)
and the ‘change of logic, change of subject’ argument seem to rule out rational
revisability. I argued that the ‘change of subject’ argument merely character-
izes rivalry, rather than showing its in principle impossibility. The translation
argument normatively rules out genuine debate and collaborative revision, but
it allows revision by individuals. So Quine’s commitment to the revisability
of logic is consistent, but unsatisfying. However, I argued that by augmenting
Quine’s framework with the distinctions between 1) logic in theory and logic
in practice, 2) laymen’s logic and considered logic, and 3) revolutionary and
evolutionary revision, the Neo-Quinean can commit to a more satisfying revis-
ability thesis. According to the Neo-Quinean view that I articulate, everything
is revisable in some manner or other, and the principle of charitable translation
merely rules out the revolution of laymen’s logic.
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